The Delhi High Court in Review: October 2019 [Part II]
News

The Delhi High Court in Review: October 2019 [Part II]

Bar & Bench

With its vast and varied case-docket, the High Court of Delhi has occasion to pronounce verdicts on diverse subjects and myriad areas of law. This two-part monthly column attempts to offer a brief overview of the important pronouncements of the High Court of Delhi over the period of the relevant month in review. While an attempt has been made to ensure the widest possible coverage of the various judgments rendered, comprehensive analysis and critique of the individual judgments is eschewed for the sake of brevity.

In continuation of the judgments discussed in Part 1 of the column, below are the further judgments from the Delhi High Court for the month of October, segregated as per practice areas.

Intellectual Property Rights

In Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors.,[1] the Court expressed anguish at the consistent delay in appointing judicial members and technical members to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board as also the lack of adequate infrastructure and autonomy and noted the requirement of emergent steps to be taken by the Government in this regard. Further, in respect of another issue surrounding the administration of institutions regulating the implementation of intellectual property rights in the country, the Court in Asianet Star Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trademarks & Anr.,[2] commented adversely on the functioning of the Trade Marks Registry and issued a slew of directions to ensure that necessary remedial measures were implemented.

In Intellectual Property Attorneys Association v. The Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks & Anr.,[3] the Court held that Section 18(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (‘Trade Marks Act’) would prevail over Rule 36 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 (‘Trade Marks Rules’) and the Registrar of Trade Marks is, therefore, required to provide specific reasons and grounds for refusing or granting conditional acceptance for registration of Trade Marks as also the material used to arrive at such a conclusion.

In Boehringer Ingelheim India Pvt. Ltd. v. Drugs Controller General of India & Anr.[4], while rejecting a challenge against the introduction of a biosimilar for treatment of acute ischemic stroke and grant of marketing approval for the same under Drugs and Cosmetics Act ,1940 (‘Drugs and Cosmetics Act’) and Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 (‘Drugs and Cosmetics Rules’), the Court inter-alia observed that the manner and extent of conducting of clinical trials, are matters to be considered by experts and the concerned authority, and it is permissible to exercise the necessary discretion in this regard with a view to ensure the achievement of the ultimate object. The Court held, therefore, that the requirements of Schedule Y of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules could be derogated from in appropriate exceptional cases.

In Less Than Equals Three Services Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Paras Mehra & Ors.,[5] the Court reiterated that though a suit for infringement of copyright preferred by a company would not be maintainable in the absence of a clear identification of the author of the work in the pleadings, if a meaningful reading of the plaint would reveal the above, though not in perfect terms, then the suit could not be thrown out at the threshold.

In the context of a product that had been registered under the provisions of the Insecticides Act, 1968 (‘Insecticides Act’), the Court in Gaur Hari Guchhait & Ors. v. Shogun Organics Ltd.[6] held that in terms of Section 30 of the Patents Act, 1970 (‘Patents Act’), such registration or disclosure made to secure the same, would not amount to disclosure to the public at large. The Court further held that while it is the product itself which is registered under the Insecticides Act, on the other hand, the Patents Act is concerned with the manufacturing process of the product.

In Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Anr. v. Naval Kishore Goyal & Ors.,[7] the Court observed that though it was permissible to award damages in a trademark infringement suit on the basis of assumptive sale of products, however, where the estimation of the plaintiff was manifestly fanciful and unconvincing, it was not obligatory to award damages on the said basis. One of the instances pointed out by the Court to reject the plaintiff’s estimation was that the same was incorrectly premised upon the total selling price of the infringing product in question as opposed to being premised upon the profit margin.

In Make My Trip (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Make My Travel (India) Pvt. Ltd.,[8] the Court examined a plea by the defendant that the plaintiff had acquiesced in the usage of the deceptively similar word, mark and letter mark, logo and domain name on the ground of exchange of admitted communications with executives of the plaintiff by the defendant over a period of time containing the aforesaid marks. The Court rejected the plea of acquiescence inasmuch as it noted that the communications had been exchanged with lower-rung executives of the plaintiff, which was a vast organization, and it could not be demonstrated that the said communications were ever exchanged with or brought to the knowledge of the higher management or key personnel of the plaintiff company. The Court similarly noted that mere knowledge of the franchisee of the plaintiff company of the usage of the offending marks could not amount to acquiescence in light of the business model adopted by the company.

Labor and Service 

In D.A.V. Senior Secondary School v. Ms. Ganga Devi,[9] the Court noted the inherent dichotomy in the stand of the management school that it was willing to take the employee concerned back in service whereas in the very same written statement the management had also simultaneously averred that the employee could not be reinstated on account of having attained the age of sixty years, and upheld a finding of illegal termination of services under Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘ID Act’).

In Delhi State Electricity Workers Union & Ors. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr.,[10] the Court held that under Section 28 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (‘Trade Unions Act’) a mere delay in communicating the fact of amendments to the rules of the trade union as adopted by its general council could not lead to a mechanical refusal to register the said amendments, particularly when Section 31 of the Act existed to cater to such situations.

In DTC v. Satbir Singh,[11] the Court held that inasmuch as there was no specific time limit prescribed for the appropriate government to exercise the power for making a reference under Section 10 of the ID Act, it would require an examination of the facts of each case to determine whether a belated dispute was eligible for reference.

In M.C.D. v. Mahesh Chand & Anr.,[12] the Court held that a finding by the Labour Court that the workman was duly reporting for duty is a pure finding of fact and unless it was shown to be manifestly perverse, the Court could not interfere with the same in exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

In Sh. Pushpender Singh Chawla v. Commissioner Employees Compensation Act & Anr.,[13] the Court noted that once a person had secured an order for liberty to initiate execution proceedings to recover a sum awarded to a deceased laborer against the contractor with whom he had entered into a property development agreement, then the appropriate remedy was initiating an execution proceeding under Section 31 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 (‘Employees Compensation Act’) and not the filing of a fresh application under Sections 12 & 13 of the Act.

In Santosh Kumar v. Delhi Jal Board,[14]  the Court noted that there was no illegality in the Labor Court’s finding that the workman’s removal from service was justified on account of his conviction for the offences under Sections 363, 366, 368 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), despite suspension of sentence by the High Court in appeal, inasmuch as it was opined that suspension of sentence does not render the conviction inoperative, and merely provides protection from incarceration.

In Vinod Kumar Aggarwal v. Poonam Mishra,[15] it was held that considering the nature of liability of a partnership firm in law, the partners of a dissolved firm were required to defend proceedings pending before the Labor Court.

In Rachin Mittal v. Union of India & Ors.,[16] the Court observed that when an office memorandum had been consistently applied to other similarly situated cases, mere non-incorporation of the same in the relevant rules would not disentitle a person from seeking benefits under the same.

In Lokesh v. Commissioner of Police & Anr.,[17] the Court commented on the desirability of maintaining a reserve list whenever a recruitment process is carried out inasmuch as it is normal for many selected candidates whose names appear in the final list to not join on account of various reasons, such as having found better avenues etc.

In Dr. Varsha Sharma v. Ministry of Human Resources Development & Ors.,[18]  the Court noted a prayer for equal pay for equal work between two posts in derogation of what has been otherwise fixed by expert bodies, could be granted only if absolute equivalence in relation to a variety of factors including degree of skill, strain of work, experience and training required, responsibility undertaken, mental and physical requirements, disagreeableness of the task, inherent hazards, fatigue etc. is conclusively and unequivocally demonstrated before the Court.

In Satya Vir Singh v. Director of Education & Anr.,[19]  the Court noted that inasmuch as there was no vested right to re-employment with an employee, the application of such an employee for re-employment would be considered on the basis of the applicable instructions which were in vogue as on the date of the consideration of the application and not on the date of preferring of the said application.

In Puran Lal Tewatia v. Govt. of NCT Delhi & Ors.,[20]  while reiterating that there was no inherent right to re-employment, the Court further observed that a dip in academic results, improper maintenance of teacher diaries, non-compliance of administrative instructions and associated shortcomings were material factors justifying rejection of an application for re-employment of a teacher.

In Ex. Nursing Orderly A.K. Bhagat v. Union of India,[21]  the Court observed that once it was established from the record that an employee facing disciplinary proceedings was given an opportunity to make a representation against a disagreement note issued by the said authority in respect to the inquiry report, and a final decision had been taken by the disciplinary authority thereafter, then the disagreement note originally issued could not be construed as containing the final opinion merely because the said note was not qualified by the word ‘tentative’ or a similar expression and merely because the text of the opinion seemed to indicate an element of finality.

In Dilshad Ali v. Union of India & Ors.,[22]  the Court held that the recovery of any amount from the pensionary dues of a retired employee could not be effected without a specific preceding show-cause notice having been issued putting the employee to notice thereof.

In Jitender Kumar v. Directorate of Health Services,[23] the Court held that when the employer in the written statement filed before the labour court had admittedly not taken a plea that Clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo) of the ID Act was attracted nor led any evidence in relation thereto, then it was impermissible for the employer to have raised such a contention for the first time before the High Court in the writ petition challenging the award of the labour court.

In National Institute of Electronics & Information Technology v. Kalpana Dudeja & Ors.,[24]  the Court noted that a denial of the opportunity to the accused employee to cross-examine prosecution witnesses in a disciplinary inquiry would vitiate the proceedings and the belated attempts by the enquiry officer to make up for this lapse by permitting cross-examination at a stage after the defence statement of the employee had already been recorded would be a mere eye-wash inasmuch as the defence would have stood disclosed. On a related note, in S.S. Rana v. Union of India & Ors.,[25]  the Court observed that non-examination of the defence witnesses cited by the employee-facing disciplinary proceedings was a denial of the right to a fair trial.

In Nishant Basoya v. Registrar General, High Court of Delhi,[26] the Court having found various answers in the answer key prepared by the examining authority to have been incorrect, proceeded to balance the equities by holding that while the candidates already declared eligible to appear in the main examination would be left undisturbed, the marks obtained by the last shortlisted candidate would be taken as the cut-off marks for the preparation of a revised list which would be computed by applying the correct answer key as decided by this Court and, accordingly, a further list of eligible candidates would be generated.

In Union  Public Service Commission v. R.A. Khan & Ors.,[27]  the Court noted that the Central Civil Services and Civil Posts for Upper Age Limit for Direct Recruitment (Rules), 1998 would override any office memorandum which purportedly contradicted the same.

In Union of India & Ors. v. Dr. Gausal Azam Khan,[28]  the Court reiterated that violation of the mandatory provisions of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 would result in the vitiation of the inquiry proceedings and the theory of substantial compliance would have no application in such a case. The Court further held that examination of the defence witnesses before the examination of the prosecution witnesses reflected a patently illegal procedure that could not be countenanced.

In Man Mohan Pandey & Ors. v. Bharat Electronics Ltd. & Ors.,[29] the Court held that when the applicable regulations expressly specify that the charge-sheet should be issued by the disciplinary authority, the issuance thereof by the subordinate authority was impermissible and the general law as enunciated to the contrary by the Supreme Court in Transport Commissioner v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy, [30] would have no application.

Land Acquisition

In Ram Prakash Mittal & Anr. v. Govt of NCT of Delhi & Ors.,[31] the Court observed that once the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the authority had been quashed, and no fresh acquisition proceedings stood initiated, then the action of raising any construction upon the said land by the authority in question was patently impermissible.

In Ombit & Anr. v. Hon’ble Lt. Governor of NCT of Delhi & Chairman of Delhi Development Authority & Ors.,[32] the Court deprecated the cavalier attitude of the Delhi Development Authority in agonizingly delaying and ultimately refusing to provide an alternative plot to a small landowner whose land had been acquired, and noted that such persons were inherently ill-equipped to wage lengthy legal battles against public authorities.

In Dhoop Chawn Construction & Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.,[33] Tarouni Construction & Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.,[34] Santur Construction & Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.,[35] and Samman Construction & Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.,[36] the Court rejected petitions under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘Land Acquisition Act’) seeking a declaration qua lapsing of the acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay and laches and reiterated that the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 does not revive claims that are patently time-barred.

Limitation

In Su-Kam Power Systems Ltd. v. Kunwer Sachdev & Anr.,[37] the Court noted that the limitation period for obtaining a declaration under Article 58 of The Limitation Act, 1963 (‘Limitation Act’) would accrue only once there was a clear and unequivocal threat from the opposite party which was detrimental to, or jeopardized, the right of the aggrieved party.

In Airports Authority of India v. Yashpal Singh Tanwar,[38]  the Court reiterated that inasmuch as an award of a labour Court passed under the ID Act is executable like a decree, the same would be subject to the limitation period prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (‘Limitation Act’).

In Roshan Lal v. Delhi Jal Board,[39] the Court observed that an application for condonation of delay premised on the ground of negligence of the erstwhile counsel is required to specifically state as to what were the efforts made by the applicant to contact the said counsel and request updates as to the status of his case.

Media Law, Censorship, Defamation and Free Speech

In Ritesh Properties & Industries Ltd. v. YouTube LLC & Ors.,[40] the Court while rejecting a suit inter-alia seeking removal of allegedly defamatory material from various online platforms, observed that when an entity engaged in the real estate business complains about defamatory statements having been made in relation to its lack of good title in the properties being sold, then it is essential for the said entity to satisfy the Court about the falsity of the allegation by producing documents that atleast prima-facie demonstrate the said good title. In the absence of any such effort being made, the Court held that no order of injunction could be passed inasmuch as it would have the effect of stifling the truth and possibly permitting continued illegal sale of properties without good marketable title.

In Puro Wellness Pvt. Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd.,[41] while considering the question as to whether certain impugned television commercials were disparaging or not, the Court noted that it was impermissible to undertake a blanket consideration of all the impugned material as constituting a concerted ‘campaign’, without considering the merits of each of the distinct and individual television commercials. While vacating the order of injunction, the Court further noted that in such cases the aggrieved party must prima-facie demonstrate a specific targeting of its products.

In Swami RamDev & Anr. v. Facebook, Inc. & Ors.,[42] the Court held that an intermediary could be directed to delete the content which was uploaded on its platform from within India, at a global level.

Original Side Rules

In Odeon Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. NBCC (India) Limited Formerly Known As National Buildings Construction Corporation Ltd.[43], the Court construed the period for the filing of a replication as provided for under Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court Original Side Rules, 2018 i.e. within 30 days and further extendable for 15 more days, as being mandatory in nature and held that no further extension of time was permissible thereunder beyond the cumulative period of 45 days.

Matrimonial Disputes Custody and Maintenance  

In Col. Ramesh Pal Singh v. Sughandi Aggarwal,[44] the Court held that in light of the bar under Section 47 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 (‘GWA’) read with Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, no appeal would lie against an order passed under Section 12 of the GWA.

In Manish Divedi v. Smt. Jyotsana,[45] the Court held that the nature of the marriage ceremony in terms of its extravagance etc. would be a cogent indicator about the financial status of the parties and their families and is a relevant factor for the Court to consider while determining ad-interim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’).

In Pawan Kumar v. Rekha[46], the Court held that the disability pension being received would also be taken into account for the purpose of calculation of the monthly earnings of the husband for the purpose of ascertaining maintenance to be paid to the estranged wife.

Personal Law and Succession

In Swami Suprakashananda & Ors. v. State & Ors.,[47] the Court while reversing the order of the trial court refusing to grant probate of a will, noted that mere non-production of the prior will as mentioned in the will for which probate was being sought would not operate as a bar to the grant of probate inasmuch as once the subsequent will is proved, any prior will is automatically rendered ineffective.

In Nand Ram v. Kanwal Singh & Anr.,[48] the Court observed that a subsequently developed grievance about the alleged injustice done to one of the parties cannot be a ground to reopen an established family settlement which had been in existence for decades.

Rent Control

In Dr. Alok Bhandari & Anr. v. Dewan Chand,[49] the Court deprecated the stand of the rent controller in granting leave to defend on the mere ground that the need expressed by the landlord was more than what the tenanted premises could provide and held further in this regard that the Court could not dictate to the landlord as to how best the premises are to be put into use after eviction. It was further held that a tenant could not require of a landlord to utilize his alternative residential property as a commercial one, contrary to the conditions of the allotment/lease. In a similar vein, in Geeta Kapoor v. Jaipal & Anr.,[50] the Court held that when the landlord had articulated six different purposes for seeking eviction, then merely because all six purposes could not be fulfilled through use of the tenanted premises after vacation, the same would not constitute a ground to deny eviction.

In Bijender Gupta v. Hardawari Lal,[51] the Court reiterated the settled law that in order to maintain an eviction petition under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (‘DRCA’) on the ground of bona-fide necessity, it is sufficient that a landlord demonstrates better title than the tenant, and he/she need not show absolute ownership.

In Dharamveer Yadav v. Nirmal Gupta,[52] the Court reiterated that grounds that do not specifically form a part of the affidavit accompanying the leave to defend application, particularly those which are unsupported by any material, cannot be considered by the rent controller. However, In Surinder Kumar Sood v. Suresh Kumar Mathur,[53] the Court noted that once the leave to defend had been granted then the tenant was not restricted only to the grounds taken in the application and he/she could raise additional pleas and grounds in the written statement against the eviction petition, though any admissions already made could not be withdrawn and admitted facts would continue to bind.

In Sushil Kumar v. Rama Mehta & Ors.,[54] the Court noted that merely because a duly enrolled advocate was working as a legal consultant with an entity would not ipso-facto lead to the conclusion that the said advocate was prohibited from carrying out private practice, and therefore not having a bona-fide need for commercial space for opening an office, more so when no such material demonstrating such a prohibition was placed on record.

In Gopal Das v. Saroj & Ors.,[55] the Court held that when a defective petition for eviction under 14 (1) (e) of the DRCA  was filed, then ordinarily the limitation for filing the application for leave to defend should have been construed from the date of curing of the defect.

In Hansraj v. Vinod Choudhary,[56] the Court held that merely because another tenant of the landlord had obtained an interim order of stay against an order of eviction would not entitle other tenants to automatic grant of leave to defend the petitions filed against them by the same landlord.

In Jawahar Lal Budhiraja v. Chander Mohan Gupta,[57] while allowing a petition challenging an order of eviction passed after a full-fledged trial on the finding that the need projected by the landlord was not at all genuine, the Court directed that the tenant who had been evicted in the eviction proceedings when the appeal was pending should be put back in possession inasmuch as on the dismissal of the eviction petition the tenant would revert to protected status under the provisions of the DRCA.

In Maher Ilahi v. Rubana Haroon,[58] the Court reiterated that it is only upon a tenant purchasing the entire ownership right in the tenanted premises can there be said to be an extinguishment of tenancy, and a part purchase would not result in any such extinguishment.

In Shiv Ram v. Anand Kumar,[59] the Court noted that an entry in the birth and death register of the municipal corporation is a public document and the rent controller was justified in preferring the same over other material while determining a petition for eviction.

In Shri Ziaullah v. Reghu Vansh Mani Sharma,[60] the Court noted that the provisions of Section 14 of the DRCA would override any contract or law to the contrary inasmuch as it began with a categorical non-obstante clause.

In Tanvir Hassan Zaidi v. Nishat Hannan & Ors.,[61] the Court reiterated that an eviction order is binding upon a sub-tenant and a sub-tenant is not otherwise a necessary party to eviction proceedings.

In V.K. Dhingra v. Shri Ram Scientific Industrial Research Foundation,[62] the Court held that once there is an established employer-employee relationship, then upon ceasing to be in employment the employee is immediately required to vacate the premises, and the traditional understanding of a landlord-tenant relationship would not apply in the said case.

Right to Information

In CPIO Delhi Cantonment Board v. Central Information Commission,[63] the Court reiterated that for the imposition of a penalty upon the Central Public Information Officer (‘CPIO’) for delayed furnishing of information under Section 20(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, it must be established that the delay was without reasonable cause or actuated by mala-fide. It was therefore held that when cogent reasons had been provided for the delay in furnishing the information, the penalty should not be imposed upon the CPIO concerned.

Specific Relief and Property

In Sanraj Farms Pvt. Ltd. v. Charan Singh & Anr.,[64] the Court reiterated that the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 (‘Land Reforms Act’) would have no application to the land in question, once a notification declaring the village, wherein the said land was situated, as a low-density residential area had been issued inasmuch as the land would then no longer remain an agricultural land.

Tax, Excise and Customs

In Maple Logistics Private Limited & Anr. v. Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors.[65], the Court construed the scope and ambit of the newly introduced Section 241A of the Income Tax Act and held that refunds could now be withheld only in accordance with the said provision. The Court further held that merely because scrutiny assessment is pending and a notice has been issued under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act would not mean that the refund would be withheld on that ground alone. The Court also emphasized on the requirement for the assessing officer to pass a transparent and reasoned order under Section 241A, after making an objective assessment of all relevant circumstances.

In Union of India v. Rose Zinc Ltd. & Ors.,[66] the Court noted that once a final order has been passed by the Customs and Central Excise Settlement Commission under Section 127(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 (‘Customs Act’), then the admission order passed earlier would merge with the final order and would no longer have an independent existence.

In Devendra Kumar Singh v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 62(1) & Ors.,[67] the Court noted that there is no bar in law to the issuance of more than one notice under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘Income Tax Act’).

In CCE Delhi -1 (Now Principal Commissioner of GST Delhi North) v. Jindal Nickel and Alloys Ltd & Ors.[68], the Court noted that it was mandatory to comply with the provisions of Section 36(B) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (‘Excise Act’) and that the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (‘CESTAT’) was, therefore, justified in discarding computer print-outs sought to be adduced as evidence in a manner which was not in compliance with the aforesaid provisions.

In Munjal Showa Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.[69], the Court observed that when a dispute regarding classification of the goods imported had been specifically adjudicated upon by the assistant commissioner of customs, the same would be an appealable order under the provisions of Section 128 of the Customs Act, and a writ petition would not lie there against.

In Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax LTU, Delhi v. Nangalamal Sugar Complex,[70] the Court held that while electricity or electrical energy would fall within the meaning of ‘excisable goods’ under the Excise Act, where the electricity sold was generated entirely from bagasse, and which item was itself in the nature of non-excisable waste residue, no demand could be levied on the same.

In Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. M/s Trinetra Impex Pvt. Ltd.[71], the Court held that even though the establishment of the element of mens-rea was not a condition precedent for the imposition of penalty in cases falling under Section 112A of the Customs Act, such an element necessarily has to be established if the penalty is sought to be imposed on an abettor.

In M/s Siddharth Export v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax[72], while reiterating that the initial onus under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act to demonstrate that transactions in question are genuine remains that of the assessee, and the mere filing of a bank statement or PAN account details would not be sufficient to discharge the said burden.

Tender and Blacklisting

In Gypsum Structural India Pvt. Ltd. v. GAIL (India) Limited & Anr.,[73] the Court upheld a tender condition which required an entity which had successfully executed certain work as a sub-contractor in the past to present a certification to this effect from the end user/owner of the said work, and refused to accept alternative documentation in lieu thereof.

In Axis Communications Through Its Managing Partner v. Wapcos Ltd. & Ors.,[74] the Court reiterated that it was impermissible for a person to challenge the terms of the tender after having participated in the same.

In Bharat Rattan Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar Dalit Utthan Evom Shiksha Samiti (Regd.) v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation,[75] the Court directed consideration of the bid of one of the bidders inasmuch as it was evident from the record that the physical copies of the bid had been handed over in person to the concerned authorities as also the record of the online portal indicated that the soft copy of the documents had been duly uploaded.

In SMS Limited v. Delhi State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd[76], the Court upheld the decision of the authority in recalling the tender, inasmuch as it found that there was due application of mind preceding the said decision and that these were matters which were primarily to be left to the discretion of the authority concerned.

In Som Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. NBCC India Ltd.[77], the Court noted that it could not condone an ‘inadvertent mistake’ on the part of the tenderer in submitting an unconditional letter of acceptance as per the format contained in the General Conditions of Contract instead of the Special Conditions of Contract as was required, inasmuch as it found that the same was an essential condition which could not be derogated from.

In Delhi Motor Truck Owners Union v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation & Anr.[78], the Court rejected a challenge to a steep increase in the earnest money stipulated in the tender on the ground that the same had been effected after a deliberated process and the same was even otherwise justified keeping in view factors such as the passage of time, relevant CVC guidelines and the applicable statutory rules.

Dr. Amit George is an Advocate practicing before the High Court of Delhi. The author would like to place on record his appreciation for the assistance provided by Mr. Rishabh Dheer, Mr. Amol Acharya, Mr. Bharat Rayadurgam and Mr. Piyo Harold Jaimon, Advocates and Ms. Neha Shajan, Law Intern.

[1] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 11346/2019

[2] Judgment dated 31.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 11284/2019

[3] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 3851/2019

[4] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in W.P (C) 7585/2016

[5] Judgment dated 11.10.2019 in CS(COMM) 914/2018

[6] Judgment dated 11.10.2019 in RFA (OS) (COMM) 41/2019 (DB)

[7] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in CS(COMM) 292/2016

[8] Judgment dated 18.10.2019 in CS(COMM) 889/2018

[9] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 1643/2017

[10] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 10254/2019

[11] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 3234/2010

[12] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 2108/2003

[13] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 10696/2019

[14] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 10100/2017

[15] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 2620/2016

[16] Judgment dated 17.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 4356/2019 (DB)

[17] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 10943/2019 (DB)

[18] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 8584/2015

[19] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in LPA 670/2019 (DB)

[20] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 10209/2019 (DB)

[21] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 8622/2019 (DB)

[22] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 3232/2019 (DB)

[23] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in LPA 79/2014 (DB)

[24] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 8015/2016 (DB)

[25] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 1881/1996 (DB)

[26] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 10592/2019 (DB)

[27] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in W.P.(C) 13439/2009 (DB)

[28] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in W.P.(C) 436/2018 (DB)

[29] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in REVIEW PET. 360/2019

[30] (1995) 1 SCC 332

[31] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in LPA 589/2019 (DB)

[32] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 8135/2013

[33] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 3645/2016 (DB)

[34] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 3648/2016 (DB)

[35] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 3634/2016 (DB)

[36] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 3646/2016(DB)

[37] Judgment dated 30.10.2019 in CS(COMM) 1155/2018

[38] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in CM(M) 1297/2018

[39] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in LPA 654/2019 (DB)

[40] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in CS(OS) 518/2019

[41] Judgment dated 31st October, 2019 in FAO (OS) 64/2019

[42] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in CS(OS) 27/2019

[43] Judgment dated 31.10.2019 in CS(COMM) 1261/2018

[44] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in MAT.APP.(F.C.) 211/2017 (DB)

[45] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in CRL.REV.P. 951/2017

[46] Judgment dated 11.10.2019 in Crl.M.C.No.4347/2019

[47] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in FAO 142/2017

[48] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in CS(OS) 1442/2015

[49] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in RC.REV. 501/2016

[50] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in RC.REV. 486/2019

[51] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in RC.REV. 221/2016

[52] Judgment dated 14.10.2019 in RC.REV. 14/2017

[53] Judgment dated 17.10.2019 in RC.REV. 464/2017

[54] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in RC.REV. 285/2018

[55] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in RC.REV. 124/2018

[56] Judgment dated 30.10.2019 in RC.REV. 609/2019

[57] Judgment dated 17.10.2019 in RC.REV. 360/2019

[58] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in RC.REV. 116/2018

[59] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in RC.REV. 593/2019

[60] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in RC.REV. 382/2019

[61] Judgment dated 24.10.2019 in RC.REV. 528/2018

[62] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in CM(M) 1400/2019

[63] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 2874/2014

[64] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in CS(OS) 165/2018

[65] Judgment dated 14.10.2019 in W.P.(C) 7003/2019 (DB)

[66] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 1108/2008 (DB)

[67] Judgment dated 14.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 13439/2018 (DB)

[68] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in CEAC 50/2018 (DB)

[69] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 12292/2018 (DB)

[70] Judgment dated 31.10. 2019 CEAC 19/2017 (DB)

[71] Judgment dated 11.10.2019 in CUSAA 195/2019 (DB)

[72] Judgment dated 24.10.2019 in ITA 917/2019 (DB)

[73] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 10649/2019 (DB)

[74] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 6657/2019 (DB)

[75] Judgment dated 17.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 11028/2019 (DB)

[76] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in W.P.(C) 765/2019 (DB)

[77] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in W.P.(C) 10916/2019 (DB)

[78] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in W.P.(C) 10849/2019

Bar and Bench - Indian Legal news
www.barandbench.com