From Professor to UK Supreme Court Justice: Lord Andrew Burrows
Lord Andrew Burrows is the first full-time academic to be appointed directly to the UK Supreme Court. He recently visited India to attend the 7th India Round Table of the COMBAR (Commercial Bar Association) in the UK, held in Mumbai.
Speaking at a session alongside former Supreme Court of India Justice Hima Kohli, Lord Burrows offered insights into the working methods of the UK Supreme Court and the methodologies employed by judges. He addressed questions about the role of the judiciary, the impact of artificial intelligence on legal practice, and access to justice.
Lord Burrows brings a unique trajectory to the UK Supreme Court. After serving as an academic at Manchester and Oxford Universities, he combined scholarly work with part-time judicial service as a Recorder and Deputy High Court Judge for over two decades. In the UK system, part-time judges such as Recorders sit on a fee-paid basis for about 15 days annually, handling similar jurisdictions to their full-time counterparts while maintaining other professional activities.
“I believe I would not have been appointed to the UK Supreme Court had I not had experience as a part-time judge,” Lord Burrows reflected, highlighting how this hybrid experience bridges academic theory and practical adjudication.
In his candid discussion with Bar & Bench, Lord Burrows explained that he tended to approach a case in the UK Supreme Court by thinking first of how the principle of law in question fitted within the bigger picture of the law. He described this as the application of the law down to the facts. This tendency was shaped by his many years as an academic lawyer focusing on the law rather than the minutiae of the facts. In contrast, it may be that a typical appellate judge, having spent much of their time as an advocate and trial judge, tends to approach a case by looking up to the law from the detailed facts. But whichever approach is taken,
“As a Supreme Court judge, our principal role is to interpret statutes and to apply and develop the common law,” Lord Burrows explained.
Lord Burrows highlighted that, almost invariably, the Court first has to decide whether to grant permission to appeal because there is no general right of appeal to the UK Supreme Court. Last year, the Court had about 180 applications for permission to appeal, ultimately delivering judgments in 43 cases.
When permission to appeal is granted, this is because the criteria of the case raising an arguable point of law of general public importance have been met, and nothing further is said. When denied, it is briefly explained that the case does not raise an arguable point of law, or one of general public importance, or both.
Lord Burrows went on to distinguish between academic research pressure and judicial responsibility.
“While the research pressure was similar to what I had as an academic, the pressure of reaching an outcome that will stand as the law was different. We don’t have to work with the quantity of cases brought in the way Justice Kohli mentioned about Indian Supreme Court judges, but yes, there is pressure about the outcome of a case,” he said.
A striking difference between the UK and Indian apex courts lies in their power to invalidate legislation. While the Indian Supreme Court can overturn primary statutes, the UK court cannot, due to the absence of a written Constitution. Instead, British judges may issue declarations of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act 1998.
A declaration of incompatibility notifies UK Parliament that legislation conflicts with the European Convention on Human Rights without invalidating the law. The courts must continue applying incompatible legislation until Parliament chooses to remedy the conflict, preserving Parliamentary sovereignty while highlighting human rights violations, he said.
“The Human Rights Act 1998 has reached a compromise. It maintains Parliamentary sovereignty and that may be said to be justified because legislation comes from an elected body, in comparison to judges, who are not elected....”
Lord Burrows praised the UK Supreme Court’s transparency initiatives, noting that all hearings are live-streamed for public access. Virtual hearings were used during COVID-19, but the UK Supreme Court has reverted to all hearings being in person since then.
"It would be possible to have a virtual hearing – and that is used for some appeals in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council – but, in general, hearings flow better, and questions from the Bench can be asked and answered more easily when the advocates are present in court."
He recognised that in a massive country like India, it has been a great step forward for the Indian Supreme Court to have virtual and hybrid hearings, which he said enhanced access to justice through remote participation options.
Addressing AI’s potential impact on legal practice, Lord Burrows adopted a measured perspective.
“It would not replace the need for judges, so their jobs were safe!” he quipped, before elaborating that even if AI could draft judgments, public trust would likely require human supervision.
“There will probably always be a human supervision required,” he emphasised, suggesting that at least at this stage, AI’s primary benefits might be in routine procedural tasks like case listing and research rather than substantive legal reasoning.
He indicated that the UK Supreme Court has recently started using AI to assist the Justices in producing transcripts of hearings.
Lord Burrows emphasised that UK courts frequently reference foreign jurisprudence, particularly from Australia and New Zealand, though surprisingly less from Indian courts despite shared common law traditions.
Discussing London’s prominence in international arbitration, Lord Burrows attributed its success to common law foundations and judicial integrity.
“Contracts between parties in different jurisdictions often have English law as the choice of law, not least because of its principle of upholding the contract terms decided by the parties, and this feeds through to most arbitrations.”
The UK system does not have a direct equivalent to the Supreme Court of India’s public interest litigation (PIL) framework or suo motu procedure. However, Lord Burrows noted that judicial review applications allow similar public interest challenges within regular litigation contexts, maintaining access to justice while preserving traditional adversarial structures that impose a “sufficient interest” requirement for standing.
For young advocates, Lord Burrows emphasised the importance of concise, powerful argumentation, hitting home simple propositions and being aware of what the good points are and not pursuing bad points. However, he tended to the view that even though hearings before the Supreme Court are shorter than in times past, there could be even shorter hearings with more time spent on questions for the advocates:
“I am not saying truncate it like the US, to 30 mins, but I think hearings of more than a day should be unusual and there should be even greater focus than at present on the questions that the judges raise having read the papers.”
Lord Burrows explained the UK’s judicial appointment system for the Supreme Court. The appointment process in the UK Supreme Court operates through open advertisement of a vacancy and the convening of a Special Appointment Commission (SAC) which, by statute, comprises the court’s President, a senior UK judge and three representatives from judicial appointment bodies across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. He says that this system ensures transparency and merit-based selection while maintaining judicial independence from political influence. There is minimal political input because, although the recommendation must be approved by the Lord Chancellor, who is a Minister in the UK Government, a recommendation for appointment can only be sent back to the SAC once.
When discussing judicial decision-making, Lord Burrows offered a candid insight:
“As a judge, while hearing the case, they got a sense of what felt right to them, but this must then be rationalised according to legal rules and principles. The priority goes to that legal rationalisation. If what feels right cannot be legally rationalised, the priority goes to the word of law, which we are duty-bound to uphold.”