Regular religious congregations on private property are subject to State regulation: Allahabad HC

The Allahabad High Court recently ruled that the offering of religious prayers on private property is not entirely immune to regulation, and may be subject to regulatory control if it involves regular or organised congregational activities [Aseen v State of UP and 3 Others].

A Division Bench of Justice Saral Srivastava and Justice Garima Prashad explained that when such activity in the private property becomes regular, organised or large in scale, it may amount to a change in the nature of use of the premises.

Thus, such activities would become subject to applicable laws, including planning and local regulations.

"Private property may be used for personal and limited religious activity so long as it remains genuinely private, occasional and non- disruptive; however, once such use extends to regular or organized congregational activity involving persons beyond a limited private sphere, it falls outside the protected domain and may attract regulatory control," the Court said.

The Bench clarified certain earlier decisions delivered by a Bench headed by Justice Atul Sreedharan. In Maranatha Full Gospel Ministries v. State of UP and 2 Others, a Bench led by Justice Sreedharan had ruled that no permission was needed for holding a religious prayer meeting on private property in Uttar Pradesh.

However, in the latest ruling delivered on April 6, the Court has held that the earlier decisions cannot be read as laying down that organised or regular congregational activity on private premises is wholly immune from regulation. 

“They [earlier verdicts] recognise a limited protection, namely where prayer remains confined to a private, non-disruptive setting. Where the activity extends beyond that sphere and begins to affect the public domain, lawful regulation follows. These decisions do not confer a right to convert private premises into an unregulated congregational space,” the Court said.

The Court was hearing a petition seeking permission and security for offering namaz at a private property in Sambhal. 

However, the State said the land in question was registered as abadi land - land meant for public use. It added that namaz has traditionally been offered at the location only on the occasion of Eid, and that no restriction has been imposed on such established practice.

It added that now there was an attempt to introduce regular large scale congregational prayers by inviting persons from within and outside the village.

The Court noted that while the Constitution protects the right to practice religion, it also makes it clear that this right is subject to public order, morality and health. 

“It is not an unlimited right. It cannot be exercised in a way that affects others or disturbs the normal functioning of public life. As is often said, one person’s freedom ends where it begins to affect someone else,” the Bench said.

The Court further said that no individual can claim a right to use public land for regular religious gatherings. 

“Such use affects movement, access and safety, and in appropriate situations, communal equilibrium; it must therefore be regulated. It is the State’s obligation to ensure equal access, civic order and non-discriminatory administration,” the Bench underscored.

The Court observed that while existing lawful practices, long-regulated arrangements, or permissions granted for limited or specific purposes may stand on their own footing, no new or unilateral claim can be founded merely on religion or personal preference. 

“The State is constitutionally entitled, and in appropriate cases duty bound, to prevent the use of public land without lawful authority,” the Bench added.

The Court observed that private prayer, family worship, and such limited devotional activity, as it remains genuinely internal to the private premises, ordinarily fall within the protected domain of religious freedoms under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

However, this protection is confined to activity that is truly private, occasional, and non-disruptive, the Court held. It does not extend to transforming any private premises into a de facto public religious venue, the Bench emphasised.

“Once the activity assumes such a congregational character, it is no longer merely a matter of inward faith. It begins to produce external consequences: it may draw repeated attendance, including persons beyond the immediate household, affect ingress and egress, create traffic and parking concerns, alter the character of the locality, generate noise, require policing, and in sensitive areas, create the possibility of inter-community tension. At that stage, the activity assumes a public or quasi-public dimension. It is not that the private property loses all protection, but that the use of such property, to that extent, no longer remains purely private for constitutional purposes and becomes amenable to reasonable regulation,” the Bench further said.

In this context, the Court said the law does not require the authorities to wait for an actual disturbance to occur before intervening. 

“Where an activity is likely to affect public order, the State is entitled to act in advance. The test is not the religious nature of the activity, but its public consequences. This approach is consistent with the constitutional principle of secularism, which requires equal treatment of all religions and equal application of law. While the State must permit private worship, it is equally bound to regulate activities that affect public order, whether on public land or on private premises. Maintaining this balance is essential to the working of Articles 25 and 26 in a constitutional system,” the Bench said.

Dealing with the case from Sambhal on merits, the Court observed that the land is question is recorded as public land.

“Even otherwise, if the land is assumed to be private, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought. The record shows that he is not protecting an existing practice, but seeking to introduce regular congregational gatherings, including persons from within and outside the village,” the Bench added, while dismissing the plea. 

Advocates Intekhab Alam Khan and Janardan Singh represented the petitioner.

[Read Judgment]